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The Indirect Effects of Trading Restrictions: 
Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Stock market trading restrictions directly affect stock prices and liquidity via constraints 
on investors’ transactions. They also have indirect effects by altering the information 
environment. We isolate these indirect effects by analyzing the effect of stock market 
restrictions on the corporate bond market. Using the staggered relaxation of the 
restrictions on margin trading and short selling in the Chinese stock market as a 
quasi-natural experiment, we find that the relaxation of these restrictions on a firm’s 
stock reduces the credit spread of its corporate bond. This effect is more pronounced for 
firms with more opaque information or lower credit ratings.  
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1. Introduction 
The effects of trading restrictions in stock markets have long been a central issue for both 
academics and policy makers. It is natural to expect stock market trading restrictions to have 
direct effects on the prices and liquidity in the stock market via constraints on investors’ 
transactions. However, to fully assess the effect of trading restrictions and hence their policy 
implications, we also need to take into account the indirect effects. For example, the trading 
restrictions in the stock market may alter the information environment about the underlying firms 
and hence affect the stock market, as well as other financial markets related to the firms, such as 
the corporate bond market.  
There has been an extensive literature on the direct effect. For example, the removal of 
selling restrictions leads to lower future stock prices (e.g., Greenwood 2009), the eligibility for 
margin trading increases stock prices and market liquidity (e.g., Kahraman and Tookes 2017, and 
Hansman et al. 2018). Our paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to analyze this indirect 
effect, i.e., the effect of stock market trading restrictions on corporate bond prices. Given the 
large size of the corporate bond market, analyzing this indirect effect is important in and of itself. 
Moreover, our study also complements the analyses of the effect on the stock market by 
shedding light on the mechanism of the indirect effects.  
We explore a series of quasi-natural experiments in China to examine the causal relation 
between trading restrictions in the stock market and the credit spreads of corporate bonds. In 
March 2010, China introduced a pilot program that made a list of stocks eligible for margin 
trading and short selling. There were four more major additions to this list over time. At the end 
of our sample (December of 2015), there were nearly nine hundred stocks on this list.   
We have two identification strategies to examine the effects of these trading restrictions. 
The first is based on diff-in-diff tests. Due to the staggered relaxation of the trading restrictions, 
our analysis does not rely on a single event but a series of events, each of which affects a subset 
of stocks. This alleviates the concern that an event may coincide with other contemporaneous 
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events or change in aggregate variables. The second identification strategy is based on a fuzzy 
regression discontinuation design (Fuzzy RDD). As discussed in detail in Section 2, stocks were 
added to the list mostly based on a formula, which is a function of the market capitalization and 
trading volume. Hence, we can estimate the local treatment effect by contrasting firms around 
the cutoff points in a Fuzzy RDD. Our main findings are as follows. 
First, our diff-in-diff analysis shows that when a stock becomes eligible for margin trading 
and short selling, the credit spread of its corporate bond decreases by 25 basis points (t=4.34) in 
our main specification, which is around 10% of the average bond spreads. We also conduct a 
placebo test. For each addition event, we create a fictitious list of 100 stocks that were ranked the 
highest according to the formula among those that were not added to the list. That is, the stocks 
on this fictitious list are not eligible for the relaxation of trading restrictions, but are similar to 
those added to the list according to the ranking formula during the most recent addition. Our 
placebo test finds no effect on the credit spreads of the firms on this fictitious list. 
Second, the evidence based on our alternative identification strategy is similar. By focusing 
on the firms around the cutoff points, our Fuzzy RDD estimates suggest that when a stock 
becomes eligible for margin trading and short selling, the credit spread of its corporate bond 
decreases by 20 to 30 basis points, depending on the choice of the bandwidth.   
Third, we find no evidence of anticipation effect in the corporate bond market. As described 
in detail in Section 2, the selection of stocks for the designated list is largely based on a formula 
and hence can be mostly predicted. However, we do not find any anticipation effect. The effect 
on bond spreads is insignificant during the six months before the stocks are added to the list. This 
effect becomes significant afterwards, and appears to grow over time. Bond yields decrease by 
14 basis points (t=2.27) during the first six months after the removal of trading restrictions in the 
stock market, and 33 basis points (t=3.86) afterwards. These results are in contrast to those in the 
stock market. For example, Hansman et al. (2018) find a strong anticipation effect in the stock 
market: there is a significant stock price run up in anticipation of the relaxation of trading 
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restrictions in the stock market.    
Our interpretation of the above findings is that the relaxation of trading restrictions not only 
increases the trading activities and liquidity in the stock market, it also improves the information 
environment of the stock market in the sense that the stock prices reveal more of investors’ 
information after trading restrictions are eliminated. Our further evidence appears consistent with 
this interpretation. 
First, when a stock becomes eligible for margin trading and short selling, its price becomes 
more efficient. Following Hou and Moskowitz (2005), we measure inefficiency as the delay in 
stock prices: the fraction of individual stock return variation that is explained by lagged market 
returns. Our diff-in-diff regression shows that when a stock becomes eligible for margin trading 
and short selling, its price becomes more efficient. Moreover, since the price is now more 
revealing, there is less informed trading in the stock market. Specifically, we use the probability 
of informed trading (PIN) measure in Easley et al (1996) and the price impact measure in Huang 
and Stoll (1996) to measure the degree of informed trading. Our evidence suggests that the 
degree of information asymmetry about a stock decreases after the trading restrictions on the 
stock are relaxed. Similarly, we find that stocks become more liquid after the trading restrictions 
are alleviated, where liquidity is measured as the bid-ask spread, Amihud (2002) ratio, as well as 
turover.   
Second, the timing of the above effects in the stock market is congruent with the indirect 
effect in the corporate bond market. In particular, consistent with the timing of the indirect effect 
on corporate bond yields, we do not find any anticipation effect on our measures of price 
efficiency and information asymmetry, as well as the bid-ask spread in the stock market.1  
Third, our interpretation implies that the effects on credit spreads should be stronger for 
                                               
1 Consistent with the findings in Hansman et al (2018), we also find that the trading volume in a stock increases if 
the stock is expected to be added to the list. Moreover, we find that the Amihud ratio decreases in anticipation of the 
relaxation of trading restrictions. This is perhaps because that Amihud ratio is constructed based on trading volume. 
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firms with lower credit ratings. As noted in the literature (e.g., Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom 
2015), the value of a debt contract is insensitive to the information about the firm asset value 
when the chance of default is remote. Hence, the effect from the information in stock prices 
should be smaller for firms with higher credit ratings. Indeed, we find that the effect on credit 
spreads for firms with AA rating or below is around four times stronger than the effect for firms 
with AAA ratings.  
Fourth, our interpretation implies that the effects on credit spreads should be stronger for 
more opaque firms. Intuitively, all else being equal, investors’ belief should respond more to the 
information in stock prices when the firm is more opaque. We construct a number of proxies for 
the opaqueness of a firm. The first measure is intangibility. Firms with a high ratio of intangible 
assets to total assets are considered to be more opaque. The second measure is a dummy variable 
that indicates whether the stock has dual listed shares (B or H shares). Cross-listed firms are 
viewed as more transparent. Our third measure is a dummy variable that indicates whether a 
firm’s financial reports are audited by one of the Big Four auditors in the most recent fiscal year. 
External auditors play an important role in improving the quality of information contained in 
financial statements. Firms with high quality auditors are expected to be more transparent. Our 
fourth and fifth measures are based on analyst forecast errors and dispersions, respectively. 
Firms with high analyst forecast errors and dispersions are viewed as more opaque. Our findings 
based on all five measures are consistent with the prediction that the effect on corporate bond 
yield spreads is stronger for more opaque firms.    
Another possible mechanism for the indirect effect is through corporate governance. Margin 
buying and short selling may improve corporate governance and thus increase bond value.2 
Using four commonly used corporate governance measures, however, we do not find any 
evidence that the relaxation of trading restrictions affects corporate governance. 
                                               
2 Using a regulatory experiment (Regulation SHO) that relaxes short-selling constraints on a random sample of U.S. 
stocks, Fang, Huang, and Karpoff (2016) show that short-selling curbs earnings management and help detect frauds. 
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Our paper contributes to the literature on the effects of trading restrictions. For example, 
Greenwood (2009) shows that when the selling restriction on a stock is lifted, its price tends to 
drop. Similarly, in the IPO context, a number of studies have documented that stock prices tend 
to decline on the lockup expiration date though the day of the event is known in advance (Field 
and Hanka (2001), Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003), Brav and Gompers (2003), and Ofek and 
Richardson (2003)). Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) provide a theoretical analysis. 
Kahraman and Tookes (2017) find that when a stock becomes eligible for margin trading, its 
liquidity improves during normal times. Hansman et al. (2018) documents the anticipation effect 
of the relaxation of trading restrictions. Our study adds to the above literature by analyzing the 
effects of stock market trading restrictions on the corporate bond market. These effects are 
necessarily indirect since the trading restrictions apply only to the stock market. We establish a 
causal relation between the relaxation of trading restrictions in the equity market and the 
decrease in corporate bond spreads. 
Our evidence suggests that information asymmetry is likely to be the main channel through 
which trading restrictions affect bond spreads. This adds to the literature that documents the 
effect of information asymmetry on asset prices. For example, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) 
show that information asymmetry increases the cost of equity. Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) 
report that stock prices decrease as information asymmetry increases due to the exogenous loss 
of analyst coverages. Chan, Menkveld, and Yang (2008) find that the China foreign share 
discount is mainly explained by information asymmetry.  
Our paper is related to the studies on margin trading and short selling. There is a large 
literature that explores the effect of margin trading on asset prices theoretically (e.g., Black 
(1972), Yuan (2005), Garleanu and Pedersen (2007), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), and 
Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012)), as well as empirically (e.g., Hardouvelis and Theodossiou, 
2002; Bhojraj, Bloomfield and Tayler, 2009; Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014; Kahraman and 
Tookes, 2017; Jylha 2018). There is also an extensive literature on short selling. A number of 
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studies suggest that short sellers are informed and short-sale constraints slow information 
discovery and decrease price efficiency (Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007), Bris, Goetzmann 
and Zhu (2007), Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), Beber and Pagano (2013), Boehmer and Wu 
(2013), Chang, Luo, and Ren (2013), Curtis and Fargher (2014), Fang, Huang and Karpoff 
(2016), and Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2017)).3  
Finally, and more broadly, our findings are related to the effects of trading restrictions on 
managerial compensation and corporate governance (e.g., Massa, Zhang, and Zhang (2014), Lin, 
Liu, and Sun (2018)). Finally, our results also add to the literature that links information 
asymmetry and credit spreads (e.g., Ivashina, 2009; Han and Zhou, 2014; Derrien, Kecskes, and 
Mansi, 2016).  
 
2. Institutional Background and Data Description   
On March 31, 2010, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) introduced a pilot 
program, which allows a list of 90 stocks to be bought on margin or sold short.4 Since then this 
designated list has gone through four major revisions, on 12/05/2011, 1/31/2013, 9/16/2013, and 
9/22/2014 respectively. Each time, around 200 stocks are added to the list.5 Meanwhile, there 
were also a few minor revisions that affect only a small number of stocks. As of December 2015, 
the end of our sample period, there were 891 stocks on this list. We obtain the historical data of 
the designated list from WIND. Table 1 summarizes the detailed information on the revisions of 
the designated stock list. 
According to the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), stocks are selected into the designated 
                                               
3 There is also a large literature that links short-sale constraints to stock overvaluation. See, for example, Miller 
(1977), Harrison amd Kreps (1978), Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), Jones and Lamont (2002), Diether, Malloy, and 
Scherbina (2002), Hong and Stein (2003), Ofek and Richardson (2003), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Asquith, 
Pathak and Ritter (2005), Nagel (2005), and Chang, Cheng and Yu (2007). 
4 See http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhxwfb/xwdd/200810/t20081005_68632.html for the announcement, on 
October 5, 2008, of the initiation of this pilot program. 
5 There are also a few minor revisions that only affect a small number of stocks. 
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list for margin trading and short selling based on a number of minimum requirements, as well as 
market capitalization and trading volume.6 Hence, at each revision, the stocks with the largest 
market capitalization and highest trading volume are included in the list. Starting from the third 
revision on January 31, 2013, the selection process has been guided more explicitly by the 
following rule. First, for each revision, stocks that are not on the list are ranked according to the 
following measure                                                   𝑋i = 2 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶i𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶 +  𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐴i𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐴 ,                                                    (1) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐶i is the average tradable market capitalization of stock i, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶 the average 
tradable market capitalization across all stocks on the exchange where stock i is listed, 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐴i 
the average trading volume of stock i, and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐴 the average trading volume across all 
stocks on the exchange where stock i is listed. Second, with some discretion by the exchanges, 
the top 100 stocks ranked by (1) are added to the list.  
Our sample includes all corporate bonds issued by firms listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges with A-shares and traded in the exchanges from January 2009 to 
                                               
6 See, for example, http://www.sse.com.cn/lawandrules/sserules/trading/universal/c/c_20150906_3976425.shtml, 
eligible stocks should meet the following minimum requirements: 
(1) Stocks have been listed on the exchange for more than 3 months. 
(2) For stocks eligible for margin buying, the number of outstanding tradable shares is not less than 100 million 
shares or the market capitalization of tradable shares is not less than 500 million yuan. For stocks are eligible for 
short selling, the number of outstanding tradable shares is not less than 200 million shares or the market 
capitalization of tradable shares is not less than 800 million yuan. 
(3) The number of shareholders is not less than 4,000. 
(4) One of the following situations did not occur in the last three months: 
a) The average daily turnover rate of the stock is lower than 15% of the daily average turnover rate of the 
benchmark index, and the average daily trading volume is less than 50 million yuan. 
b) The deviation between the average absolute daily return of the stock and the average absolute daily return of 
the benchmark index exceeds 4%. 
c) Stock volatility is more than five times of the volatility of the benchmark index. 
(5) The issuing company of the stock has completed the reform of split share structure. 
(6) Stock trading is not subject to risk warnings by the stock exchange. 
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December 2015.7 For those firms, we obtain their stock prices, financial statements, corporate 
governance, institutional holdings, and analyst earnings forecasts from China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Corporate bond prices, treasury yields, and detailed 
information on margin buying/short selling are obtained from WIND. Intraday stock trading data 
is from RESSET. 
As shown in Table 2, our sample includes 16,639 monthly observations of corporate bond 
spreads, covers 571 bonds issued by 407 companies, among which 239 companies have been 
included in the designated list during our sample. The credit spread of a corporate bond, denoted 
as Spread, is the bond yield minus the yield on a Treasury security with comparable maturity. 
The average bond spread is 2.46% and the average bond maturity is 3.72 years. For each 
company, we dine a dummy variable, List, which equals one if the stock is on the designated list 
(and hence is eligible for margin buying and short selling in the current month) and zero 
otherwise. The average value of List in our sample is 0.482, suggesting that 48.2% of the 
observations belong to bonds issued by stocks included in the margin trading list.  
Probability of informed trading (PIN) is constructed from intraday buy- and sell-initiated 
orders within a quarter. We use the likelihood function in Easley et al. (1996) and apply the 
transformation method in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2010). The average PIN of the sample 
is 0.110. Price impact (PI) is calculated as the monthly average of daily adverse-selection 
component of trading costs estimated from intraday data following the method in Levi and 
Zhang (2015). The average PI of the sample is 2.967 basis points. Price efficiency (PriceEff) is 
calculated according to Hou and Moskowitz (2005) and Boehmer and Wu (2013). The average 
price efficiency measure of the sample is 0.289. Detailed definitions of all variables are included 
Appendix A. 
                                               
7 There are two secondary bond markets in China, the exchange market and the interbank market. Corporate bonds 
and convertible bonds issued by publicly listed non-financial companies are only traded in the exchange market. Our 
sample does not include convertible bonds. During 2009-2015, listed companies in China issue 863 billion (in CNY) 
corporate bonds in total.  
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3. Stock Trading Restrictions and Corporate Bond Spreads  
The relaxation of stock trading restrictions allows investors to take on larger positions, and hence 
directly affects the prices and liquidity in the stock market. For example, Kahraman and Tookes 
(2017) demonstrates the causal relation between margin trading and improved stock market 
liquidity during normal times. Hansman et al. (2018) find that in anticipation of the introduction 
of margin trading on a stock, investors bid up its price to “front run” the investors who are 
optimistic about the stock, but are capital constrained.  
 Our focus is the indirect effects. For instance, the higher liquidity in the stock market may 
improve the price efficiency and reduce the uncertainty about the firms, which then leads to 
indirect effects on the stock market, as well as other financial markets such as corporate bond 
market. We will focus on the effects on the corporate bond market in this section, and revisit the 
effects on the stock market in Section 4.1.  
 
3.1.  The effect on corporate bond spreads 
We estimate the effect of trading restrictions using a difference-in-difference methodology with 
multiple periods and multiple treatment groups. Specifically, we run the following regression:                 𝑆𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑏1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + γ𝑧𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                           (2) 
where 𝑆𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the credit spreads of bond i in month t. Listi,t is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the issuer of bond i is on the designated list in month t and zero otherwise. The 
coefficient on Listi,t captures the effect of the relaxation of trading restrictions on bond spreads. 
zi,t is a vector of bond and firm characteristics as control variables, including firm size, 
book-to-market ratio, return-on-assets, leverage, state ownership, bond maturity, bond return 
volatility, and bond illiquidity. All accounting variables are measured at the most recent fiscal 
year end and at least three months are required between the fiscal year end and the current month 
in order for the accounting information to be released to the market. This regression includes 
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bond fixed effects and time fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the bond level to 
account for the presence of serial correlation in the data. 
Due to the staggered addition of the list for margin trading and short selling, our 
identification strategy does not rely on a single event but a series of events, each of which only 
affects a subset of stocks. This alleviates the concern that a single treatment event may coincide 
with other contemporaneous events or changes in aggregate variables. Moreover, our control 
group is not restricted to firms that are never added to the list. In fact, we can estimate equation 
(2) for firms that are eventually added to the designated list. The regression takes all firms that 
are not included in the list as the control group, even if they will be included into the list later on. 
Columns 1-2 of Table 3 report the regression results based on our full sample. In column 1, 
the estimated coefficient on List is -0.240 with a t-statistic of 4.00, suggesting that bond spreads 
decrease by 24 basis points after the firm is included in the list. Given the average spread is 246 
basis points, the restriction relaxation leads to a nearly 10% decrease in credit spreads.  
Column 2 controls for various bond and firm characteristics and the coefficient of List 
remains similar, and is -0.249 (t= 4.34). It is well documented that bond prices contain a sizable 
liquidity component.8 Hence, we also include various bond (il)liquidity measures as control 
variables. Our primary measure of bond (il)liquidity, illiquidity_B, is the monthly Amihud (2002) 
ratio, which is constructed from daily bond return and trading volume. We also construct two 
other bond (il)liquidity measures from intraday bond trading data: BASpread_B and (ln)Depth_B. 
BASpread_B is the monthly average of intraday bid-ask spread calculated as the ask minus the 
bid divided by the average bid and ask price. (ln)Depth_B is the natural logarithm of the monthly 
average of intraday market depth calculated as bid price times bid volume plus ask price times 
ask volume. Our results remain similar when we use these two alternative liquidity measures as 
control variables.  
                                               
8 See, for example, Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), Covitz and Downing (2007), Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), Lin, 
Wang, and Wu (2011), and Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2013). 
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One concern on the identification strategy is that the selection of stocks to the designated 
list maybe endogenous. For example, large firms may be more likely to be included in the list. 
While level differences and common trends are easily handled by the difference-indifference 
estimator, differential trends among the treatment and control groups will generally lead to 
inconclusive or erroneous inferences (Roberts and Whited (2013)). To alleviate the concern, we 
use two alternative samples to test the effect of margin trading.  
First, we restrict our sample to firms that are eventually added to the designated list. We 
essentially use the same set of firms as both the treatment and control group. By excluding firms 
that are never included in the list, this specification minimizes the systematic differences 
between the treatment and control groups, and thus alleviates the concern of non-parallel trends. 
The results based on this sample are reported in columns 3-4. The results remain similar. The 
coefficient of List is -0.152 (t=2.33) and -0.171 (t=2.66) for regressions without (column 3) and 
with (column 4) controls variables, respectively. 
Second, we create a matching sample. For each month, each bond issued by a firm on the 
designated list is matched by a similar bond issued by a firm that is not on the list. The matching 
is based on the Mahalanobis distance calculated from bond maturity and the issuing firm’s stock 
market capitalization, turnover, and volatility.9 The results based on this matched sample, 
reported in columns 5-6, remain similar. The coefficient on List is -0.166 (t=2.73) and -0.175 
(t=3.03) for regressions without (column 5) and with (column 6) controls variables, respectively. 
Figure 1 visualizes the above regression results by plotting the average monthly bond 
spreads for treated firms, control firms, and the difference between the two groups. The 
treatment date (t=0) refers to the month when a stock is included in the designated list. The 
figure shows that bond spreads of the two groups follow similar trends before the treatment. 
                                               
9  Due to the limited number of bonds available during early sample period, logistic regressions used in 
propensity-score matching may generate unreliable results. Thus, we use Mahalanobis distance as the matching 
criteria instead.  
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Afterwards, however, the treated firms experience significant decrease in their bond spreads. The 
difference between the average spreads of treated and control firms decreases from -0.43 
percentage point one month before the event to -0.70 percentage point six months after the stocks 
are added to the margin trading list, which implies a difference-in-difference estimate of 0.27 
percentage point.  
 
3.2. Timing of the effect on bond spreads 
In order to examine the timing of the above effect on bond yields, we replace the dummy 
variable 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 by three dummy variables: 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(-6), 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(6), and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(7+). 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(-6) is 
one if stock i is not on the list in month t but will be added to the list within 6 months after t, and 
is zero otherwise. Similarly, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(6) is one if stock i is on the list in month t and has been 
added to the list for no more than 6 months, and is zero otherwise. 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(7+) is one if stock i is 
on the list in month t and has be added to the list for 7 months or more, and is zero otherwise. 
Hence, the coefficients of the three new dummy variables reflect the timing of the effects of the 
relaxation of trading restrictions on credit spreads. The coefficient of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(-6) captures the 
potential anticipatory effect, the effect on credit spreads during the 6 months before stock i is 
added to the list. The coefficients of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(6) and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(7+) capture the effects during and after 
the first 6 months, respectively.  
Our results, reported in Panel A in Table 4, show that the effect of the relaxation of trading 
restrictions on credit spreads starts after the firm is included in the list and gets stronger over 
time. For example, as shown in column 1, the coefficient of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(-6) is -0.043 (t=0.70). That is, 
there is no evidence of anticipatory effect: there is no detectable effect on credit spreads before 
the trading restrictions are relaxed. In contrast, the coefficients of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(6) and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(7+) are 
-0.142 (t=2.15) and -0.333 (t=3.68), respectively. That is, the effect on credit spreads is 
significant after the relaxation of trading restrictions is effective, and gets stronger over time. In 
the second column, we include bond and firm characteristics as controls, and the results remain 
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very similar. These results on the timing of the effect are consistent with the plot in Figure 1. 
Our results highlight the difference relative to the effects on the stock market. For example, 
Hansman et al. (2018) find a strong effect in the stock market before the trading restrictions are 
actually relaxed. After a stock is added to the list, financially constrained investors would be able 
to access more credit and are expected to bid up the price of the stock. Anticipating this, 
unconstrained investors would “front run” and bid up the price of the stock during the several 
quarters before the relaxation. In contrast, in the corporate bond market, the effect of the 
relaxation of trading restrictions does not materialize until the restriction is effective, and 
becomes stronger over time afterwards. In other words, the effect we documented above is not a 
mere reflection of the effect in the equity market.  
 
3.3. Placebo tests 
We conduct a placebo test in this section. Specifically, for each of the five major additions to the 
designated list, we create a fictitious list of stocks that are ranked the highest according to (1) 
among the stocks that were not added to the list at the addition. That is, after the each addition to 
the list, the stocks on our fictitious list are not eligible for margin trading or short selling but, 
according measure in (1), are similar to those became eligible after the most recent revision. We 
construct measure (1) based on the data during the three months before each addition event, and 
choose the number of the stocks on this fictitious list to be the same as the number of stocks that 
were actually added to the designated list at the most recent revision. Hence, after each major 
revision, our fictitious list stays the same until the next major revision.  
We create a dummy variable 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑉it, which is one if stock i is on this fictitious list 
in month t, and zero otherwise. We then rerun regression (2) by adding 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑉. The 
results are reported in Table 5. As shown in column (1) of Panel A, the coefficient of List is 
-0.275 (t=3.83). In contrast, the coefficient of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑉 is -0.064 (t=1.07). That is, the 
relaxation of the trading restrictions reduces the bond yields of firms on the actual list, but there 
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is no such effects on our fictitious list. We include controls in the regression in second column 
and the results remain very similar.  
We decompose the dummy variable 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿it into 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑁𝐴𝑁it and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑂𝑉𝑆it. 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑁𝐴𝑁it 
is one if stock i is on the actual list in month t and was added to the list in the most recent 
addition, and zero otherwise. Similarly, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑂𝑉𝑆it is one if stock i is on the actual list in month 
t and has been on the list before the most recent addition, and zero otherwise. That is, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑁𝐴𝑁 
includes all the newly added firms while 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑂𝑉𝑆 includes firms that have been on the list 
before that.  
We replace List by 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑁𝐴𝑁 and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑂𝑉𝑆 in the regression to account for the timing 
effect. The results are reported in columns 3-4. In both columns, the coefficients of List_Old and 
List_New are significantly negative, suggesting that both previously and newly added firms 
experience lower bond spreads. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient of List_New is 
around half of that of List_Old, consistent with our previous finding that the effect on bond 
spreads becomes stronger several months after the addition. In contrast, the coefficient of 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑉 remains insignificant.  
Since the selection rule (1) is not explicitly stated until the third addition event (on January 
31 2013), we repeat the above placebo analysis in the subsample from February 2013 to 
December 2015. The results, reported in Panel B, remain very similar to those in the full sample.  
In summary, our results suggest that while firms ranked right above the threshold (and thus 
are included into the list in an addition event) experience lower bond spreads, those ranked right 
below the threshold (and thus are on our fictitious list) do not experience lower bond spreads.  
 
3.4. Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design  
To further identify the effect of trading restrictions on corporate bond spreads, we analyze it 
based on a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (Fuzzy RDD) in this section. Note that the 
measure in (1) is not precise about the exact selection procedure. For example, the exact sample 
15 
 
period used by the exchanges to construct measure (1) is not publicly known. We use the data 
during the three-month window before the announcement date of each addition. Hence, our 
ranking may not be exactly the same as those obtained by the exchanges. Moreover, the 
exchanges have discretions in their screening rules. Since our measure in (1) cannot completely 
predict the list for each addition, we adopt the fuzzy RDD to estimate the local treatment effect 
for this case of local random assignment.  
Following Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001) and Chang, Hong, and Liskowich 
(2015), we use two-stage least-squares to estimate the effect of relaxation of trading restrictions. 
Specifically, we focus on the last three major revisions, since the explicit rule (1) was not 
adopted until 1/31/2013. For revision k (k=3, 4, 5), and for each stock that is not on the 
designated list, we compute 𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑘 according to measure (1) based on the data during the 
three months before the revision date. Let 𝑃𝑘 denote the number of stocks added to the list at 
revision k. The dummy variable 𝜏𝑖𝑘 is one if 𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑘 ≤ 𝑃𝑘, and zero otherwise. Finally, we 
define the dummy variable 𝐷𝑖𝑘 is one if stock i is added to the designated list at revision k, and 
zero otherwise.  
While 𝐷𝑖𝑘 is potentially endogenous, 𝜏𝑖𝑘 is locally random around the cutoff and can be 
used as an instrument for 𝐷𝑖𝑘. Figure 2 plots 𝐷𝑖𝑘 against 𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑘 − 𝑃𝑘 for each addition k. 
As shown in all three panels, there is a discontinuous jump at the cutoff pint. That is, the 
probability for a stock to be added to the designated list jump up if its ranking is higher than the 
cutoff threshold.   
We pool the data for all three additions to estimate the first stage regression with a local 
linear specification: 
𝐷𝑖
𝑘 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝜏𝑖𝑘 + 𝛼2�𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑘 − 𝑃𝑘� + 𝛼3𝜏𝑖𝑘�𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑘 − 𝑃𝑘� + 𝜀𝑖𝑘.    (3) 
The estimated coefficient 𝛼1 represents the discontinuity in the probability of being included in 
the list at the cutoff. For the second stage, we regress bond spreads after addition k and before the 
next major revision on 𝐷�𝑖𝑘, which the predicted value of 𝐷𝑖𝑘 from the first stage. Specifically, 
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we pool the data for all three additions to estimate the following regression: 
𝑆𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷�𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽2�𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑘 − 𝑃𝑘� + 𝛽3𝜏𝑖𝑘�𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑘 − 𝑃𝑘� + 𝜈𝑖𝑡.     (4) 
The estimated coefficient 𝛽1 identifies that local treatment effect on bond spreads. The choice 
of bandwidth determines the number of firms on each side of the cutoff points in our estimation. 
In our setup, we vary our bandwidth from 100 to 50 by a step of 10. Our local linear 
specification allows the bond spreads to vary linearly on either side of the cutoff. Moreover, we 
use a triangular kernel in the estimation, which gives more weight on the firms close to the cutoff 
and thus reduces the potential influence from firms far from the cutoff.  
Our estimation results are reported in Table 6. Panel A presents the results from the 
first-stage regression. In column one, where the bandwidth is 100, the coefficient 𝛼1 is 0.591 
(t=11.76), suggesting that firms just above the cutoff are 59.1% more likely to be added to the 
designated list than firms just blow the cutoff. The adjusted R2 of the regression is 61.5%. As the 
bandwidth varies from 100 to 50, the estimates of coefficient 𝛼1 remain very similar. 
Panel B reports the second-stage regression. In column one, there the bandwidth is 100, the 
coefficient of interest 𝛽1 is estimated to be -0.303 (t=3.42), suggesting a 30.3 basis point 
decrease in bond spreads for firms just above the cutoff rank compared with firms just below it. 
As the bandwidth varies from 100 to 50, the estimate of coefficient 𝛽1 remains significantly 
negative. The magnitude of our estimated local treatment effect is only slightly larger than that 
our baseline regressions in Table 3. 
 
4. Interpretation  
The above results suggest that there is a causal relation between the stock market trading 
restrictions and the corporate bond spreads. What is the mechanism through which the relaxation 
of trading restrictions in the stock market affects bond spreads? Our conjecture is as follows. 
When margin trading and short selling is allowed, the direct effect is that investors would be able 
to trade more aggressively in the equity market when needed. As a result, equity prices become 
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more informative. The indirect effect is that the more informative equity prices reduce the 
uncertainty for bond investors and hence increases bond prices (i.e., decrease bond spreads).  
 To examine this conjecture, we first test if margin trading and short selling reduces the 
degree of information asymmetry in the equity market and improves its price efficiency in 
Section 4.1. We then examine the cross-sectional variation in the effect on bond yields in 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Finally, in Section 4.4, we examine an alternative mechanism.  
 
4.1. The effect in the equity market 
Trading restrictions potentially prevent information from being fully revealed in asset prices, 
making asset prices noisier and less informative when informed investors cannot fully trade on 
their signals. Hence, one conjecture is that the relaxation of trading restrictions improves the 
information environment in the equity market, and enhances the price efficiency and market 
liquid. To test this conjecture, we run the following regressions 
             𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑏1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + γ𝑧𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                          (5) 
where the dependent variable 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is chosen to reflect the market liquidity, price efficiency, and 
the degree of information asymmetry of stock i. Specifically, we adopt the price inefficiency 
measure Inefficiency from Hou and Moskowitz (2005) and Boehmer and Wu (2013), which is 
constructed to capture the portion of individual stock return variation that is explained by lagged 
market returns and essentially is a measure for price delay. We adopt two measures that have 
been measured to capture the degree of information asymmetry in the stock market, PIN and 
Cost, where PIN is designed to measure the probability of informed trading (Easley et al. (1996) 
and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2010)) and PI is captures the adverse-selection component 
of trading costs (e.g., Huang and Stoll (1996), Levi and Zhang (2015)). Finally, we adopt three 
commonly used market liquidity measures, 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the average bid-ask spread of stock 
i in month t, 𝐴𝑉𝐿ℎ𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡  is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio stock i in month t, and 
𝑇𝑉𝑆𝑟𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the logarithm of the average turnover of stock i in month t. Listi,t is a dummy 
18 
 
variable that equals one if firm i is on the designated list in month t and zero otherwise. Zi,t is a 
vector of firm characteristics as control variables, including firm size, book-to-market ratio, 
return-on-assets, leverage, state ownership, stock return volatility, and stock illiquidity. All 
accounting variables are lagged for at least three months to make sure that they have been 
revealed to the market. We restrict our sample to stocks that have valid bond trading data during 
our sample period. All regressions control for firm and month fixed effects and allow for 
clustering of the observations at the firm level.  
The results are reported in Table 7. In the first column, where the dependent variable is 
Inefficiency, in the regression in column six, the coefficient of List is -0.037 (t=4.38), suggesting 
that relaxation of trading restrictions increases the efficiency of stock prices (i.e., reduces the 
price inefficiency). As shown in column two, where the dependent variable is PI, the estimated 
coefficient of List is -0.168 (t=2.20), suggesting that the relaxation of trading restrictions reduces 
the adverse selection component of trading cost. Similarly, column three suggests that the 
relaxation of trading restrictions reduces the probability of information trading. These results are 
consistent with the interpretation that when trading restrictions are removed, it reduces the 
information asymmetry and improves the price efficiency in the stock market.   
In column four, where the dependent variable is the bid-ask spread, the coefficient of List is 
-0.014 (t=3.43), suggesting that the relaxation of trading restrictions reduce the bid-ask spread by 
1.4 basis points. Similarly, columns five and six show that the relaxation of trading restrictions 
reduces the Amihud ratio and increases turnover. Consistent with the findings in Kahraman and 
Tookes (2017), these results suggest that the relaxation of trading restrictions increases the 
liquidity in the stock market.  
Interestingly, the timing of the above effects in the stock market is congruent with our 
earlier effects in the corporate bond market. Specifically, as in Section 3.2, we replace the 
dummy variable 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡  by three dummy variables: 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 (-6), 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 (6), and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 (7+) to 
examine the timing of the effects on the stock market. As shown in column (1) of Panel B, the 
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coefficient of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(-6) is insignificantly different from zero, while those of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(6) and 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(7+) are highly significant. That is, there appear to be no anticipation effect on market 
efficiency. The market efficiency of a stock increases only after the trading restrictions on the 
stock are relaxed. Similarly, columns (2) and (3) show that the effects of trading restrictions on 
information asymmetry arise only after the restrictions are relaxed. The timing of the effects on 
bid-ask spreads is similar, as shown in columns (4).  
Consistent with the findings in Hansman et al. (2018), as shown in column (6), the trading 
volume in a stock increases when the stock is expected to be added to the list. Moreover, we find 
that Amihud ratio decreases in anticipation of the relaxation of trading restrictions. This is 
perhaps because that Amihud ratio is constructed based on trading volume.   
Taken together, our evidence suggests that the anticipation of the relaxation of trading 
restrictions on a stock increases the trading activities in the stock. However, the market 
efficiency and information environment of the stock only improves after the restrictions are 
relaxed. This timing is consistent with our evidence in Section 3 that the information 
environment of a firm’s corporate bond improves only after the trading restrictions on the firm’s 
stock are relaxed.   
 
4.2.  Opaqueness  
In this section, we further test our interpretation that the relaxation of trading restrictions 
improves the information environment about the underlying firms. An implication from this 
interpretation is that the improvement should be stronger and so the effect on bond yields should 
be stronger for more opaque firms.  
To test this implication, we adopt a number of measures that are commonly used as proxies 
for the opaqueness of a firm in the literature. The first measure is intangibility. Firms with high 
intangible assets to total assets ratios are difficult to value and hence are more opaque (Barth, 
Kasznik and Mcnichols, 2001; Baylis et al, 2017). We construct a dummy variable, Intangible, 
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which is one if the firm’s intangible asset ratio is higher than the median of the full sample and 
zero otherwise.10  
Our second measure is NoDualList, a dummy variable of cross-listing status that is one if 
the stock does not have dual listed shares (B or H shares) and zero otherwise. Cross-listed firms 
commit to higher levels of disclosure and regulations (Bailey, Karolyi and Salva, 2006) and 
hence investors are able to obtain more precise information about the value of their growth 
opportunities (Foucault and Gehrig, 2008; Foucault and Frésard, 2012). Thus, dual-listed firms 
are likely to be more transparent. 
Our third measure is NoBig4Audit, a dummy variable that is one if a firm’s financial reports 
are not audited by a Big 4 auditor at the most recent fiscal year end and zero otherwise. External 
auditors play an important role in improving the quality of information contained in financial 
statements. Firms with high quality auditors are expected to provide more credible firm-specific 
information and better investor protection (Gul, Kim and Qiu, 2010). Firms without international 
Big 4 auditors are likely to be more opaque for outside investors. 
We also consider two measures based on analyst earnings forecasts. Analyst forecast errors 
and dispersions reflect the accuracy of analyst forecasts. Firms with high analyst forecast errors 
and dispersions are likely to be more opaque (e.g., Thomas, 2002). Error_High is a dummy 
variable that is one if the firm’s analyst forecast error is higher than the median of the full sample 
and zero otherwise. Dispersion_High is a dummy variable that is one if the firm’s analyst 
forecast dispersion is higher than the median of the full sample and zero otherwise. 
We add an interaction term between List and the above five measures to regression (2). The 
results are reported in Table 8. As shown in column one, the coefficient of the interaction term is 
-0.135 (t=2.00), suggesting that the effect on the bond yields of opaque firms is 75% 
(=(0.135+0.179)/0.179) stronger than that on other firms. Similarly, the interaction terms in 
columns two through five are all highly significant, and their signs are consistent with the 
                                               
10 The results remain similar if we use the intangible asset ratio instead of this dummy variable.   
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implication that the effect on bond yields is stronger for opaque firms.  
Taken together, these results are consistent with the interpretation that the relaxation of 
trading restrictions improves the information environment for the underlying firms, and hence 
reduces their bond yields. This effect is stronger when the firm is more opaque.  
 
4.3. Credit ratings  
As noted in the literature (e.g., Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom 2015), the value of a debt contract 
is insensitive to the information on the value of firm asset when the chance of default is remote. 
Hence the reduction of uncertainty should have smaller effects on bond yields for firms with 
higher credit ratings.  
To test this hypothesis, we augment the regression in (2) by adding interaction terms 
between List and bond credit ratings. We obtain credit ratings and merge with our earlier sample. 
Among all 571 bonds in this merged sample, there are 150, 158, 254, and 9 bonds rated as AAA, 
AA+, AA, AA- at issuance, respectively. We construct a dummy variable AAA, which is one if 
the rating of the firm is AAA, and zero otherwise. Dummy variable AA+ is defined similarly. 
Due to the small number of bonds with credit rating below AA, we defined a dummy variable 
AAorBelow, which is one if a bond with current credit rating of AA or below and zero otherwise. 
We include the three interaction terms, List×AAA, List×AA+, and List×AAorBelow, in regression 
(2) and the results are reported in Table 9. 
Column 1 presents the estimated coefficients on the three interaction terms between List and 
credit ratings by controlling for bond, month and credit rating fixed effects. Column 2 further 
control for various bond and firm characteristics. It is evident that the coefficient on the 
interaction term is economically and statistically more significant for lower credit ratings. The 
coefficient on List×AAA is -0.065 (t=1.02), while the coefficients of List×AA+ and 
List*AAorBelow are -0.257 (t=3.63) and -0.336 (t=4.36), respectively. Our results are consistent 
with the prediction that the effect from the relaxation of trading restrictions is stronger for firms 
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with the lower credit ratings.   
  
4.4. Corporate governance 
The relaxation of trading restrictions may affect bond yields through the corporate governance 
channel. As noted in the literature, the relaxation of trading restrictions may improve corporate 
governance. For example, using a regulatory experiment (Regulation SHO) that relaxes 
short-selling constraints on a random sample of U.S. stocks, Fang, Huang, and Karpoff (2016) 
show that short-selling curbs earnings management and help detect fraud. As a result, the 
removal of reading restrictions would decrease bond yields.  
Following Jiang and Kim (2015), we adopt four commonly used corporate governance 
measures. The first measure is the ratio of independent directors (IndepDir). Firms with low ratio 
of independent directors are lack of monitoring and have weak corporate governance (e.g., Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988). The second measure is CEO duality (Dual), which is one if 
the firm’s CEO also serves as the chairman and zero otherwise. Firms with CEO duality is 
considered to have weak corporate governance. The third measure is the firm’s divergence ratio 
(Divergence), which measures the separation between control rights and ownership rights. As the 
difference between control rights and cash flow rights increases, controlling shareholders are 
likely to expropriate firm resources and corporate governance becomes weak (e.g., Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). The fourth measure is managerial ownership (MgtHold), which is defined as the 
ratio of the total number of shares held by directors, supervisors, and executives to the total 
number of shares outstanding. The relation between managerial ownership and corporate 
governance is ambiguous in general. On one hand, managerial ownership may help resolve the 
agency conflict between insider managers and outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
On the other hand, manager may become entrenched when they own a significant amount of the 
firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988). As discussed by Jiang and 
Kim (2015), managers in China are rarely get entrenched since the majority of Chinese firms 
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have a large controlling shareholder that can easily fire the manager no matter how many shares 
the manager owns. Thus, firms with low managerial ownership are generally perceived as having 
high agency costs and weak corporate governance in China.  
We regress these measures on List to analyze if the removal of trading restrictions affects 
corporate governance. As shown in Table 10, in all regressions, the coefficients of List are 
insignificantly different from zero. That is, we do not find any evidence that this relaxation of 
trading restrictions affected corporate governance in our sample.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Trading restrictions directly prevent investors from establishing and adjusting their positions, and 
hence reduce market liquidity. On the other hand, they also have indirect effects, since they 
hinder information aggregation. Our paper focuses the indirect effects by analyzing the effects of 
stock market trading restrictions on corporate bonds. Specifically, we exploit a series of 
quasi-natural experiments, where around 900 stocks were added, on five occasions, to a 
designated list, whereby margining trading and short selling became feasible.  
Our evidence based on diff-in-diff and fuzzy RDD analysis suggests that this relaxation of 
trading restrictions in the stock market reduces the yield spread in the corporate bond market. 
This effect is stronger for firms that are more opaque or have lower credit ratings. Our overall 
evidence is consistent with the interpretation that the relaxation of trading restrictions improves 
the information aggregation in the stock market, leading to lower uncertainty about the firm and 
hence lower bond yields.  
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Appendix A. Definitions of Variables 
 
Variable name Variable definition 
Spread (in %) Bond credit spread. The yield of a corporate bond minus the 
yield of a Treasury with comparable maturity. Monthly spread is 
calculated as the average of daily credit spreads within a month. 
Maturity (in years) Time to maturity of the bond. 
Volatility_B The monthly bond price volatility is the average of daily bond 
price volatility, which is defined as (daily maximum price - daily 
minimum price)/daily minimum price. 
Illiquidity_B The monthly Amihud ratio of a bond is the monthly average of 
daily Amihud ratio for the bond, which is defined as 100×daily 
absolute bond return (in %) divided by trading volume (in 
Chinese Yuan). 
BASpread_B (in %) Monthly bid-ask spread of a bond is the monthly average of 
intraday bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spread defined as 2× 
(ask-bid)/(bid+ask). 
(ln)Depth_B (in yuan) Natural logarithm of the monthly market depth of a bond, which 
is the monthly average of intraday market depth. The depth is 
defined as bid price×bid volume + ask price×ask volume. 
List A dummy variable, which is one if the stock is eligible for 
margin borrowing and short selling in the current month and 
zero otherwise. 
(ln)Size (in million yuan) Natural logarithm of the market capitalization calculated 
according to the firm’s tradable shares at the month end. 
BM Book to market ratio, defined as the book value of equity 
divided by the market value of equity at the most recent fiscal 
year end. 
ROA (in %) Return on Assets, defined as net income divided by total assets 
at the most recent fiscal year end. 
Lev Leverage ratio, defined as total liabilities divided by total assets 
at the most recent fiscal year end. 
SOE A dummy variable of state owned enterprise, which equals one 
if the firm is state owned in the most recent fiscal year end and 
zero otherwise. 
Intangibiity Net intangible assets divided by total assets at the most recent 
fiscal year end. 
NoDualList A dummy variable of cross-listing status, which is one if the 
stock is not AH or AB cross-listed in the current month and zero 
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otherwise 
NoBig4Audit A dummy variable of big four audit, which equals one if the 
financial report is not audited by a big-four auditing firm at the 
most recent fiscal year end and zero otherwise 
ForecastErr Analyst forecast errors, defined as the absolute difference 
between the consensus EPS forecast and the actual EPS, scaled 
by the absolute value of consensus EPS forecast. Consensus EPS 
forecast is defined as the mean value of EPS forecasted by all 
analysts on the stock between January 1st and December 31th. 
ForecastDisp Analyst forecast dispersion, defined as the standard deviation of 
all analyst EPS forecasts scaled by the absolute value of 
consensus EPS forecast. Where consensus EPS forecast and 
dispersion is calculated from the EPS forecasted by all analysts 
on the stock between January 1st and December 31th. 
IndepDir Numbers of independent directors divided by total numbers of 
directors at the most recent fiscal year end 
MgtHold Total stock shares held by directors, supervisors and executives 
divided by total shares outstanding at the most recent fiscal year 
end 
Divergence (in %) The separation between control rights (voting rights) and 
ownership rights (cash flow rights) at the most recent fiscal year 
end, defined as the ultimate controller's control rights minus 
ownership rights. Control rights are defined as the weakest link 
in the chain of control rights. Ownership rights are defined as the 
product of ownership stakes along the chain of control rights. 
Dual CEO duality, a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO and 
chairman is the same person at the most recent fiscal year end 
and zero otherwise 
PIN Probability of informed trading calculated from intraday buy- 
and sell-initiated orders within a quarter. We use the likelihood 
function in Easley et al. (1996) and apply the transformation 
method in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2010). 
PI (in basis points) Price impact, defined as monthly average of daily 
adverse-selection component of trading costs calculated from 
intraday data following the method in Levi and Zhang (2015). 
PriceEff Price efficiency is calculated according to Hou and Moskowitz 
(2005) and Boehmer and Wu (2013). Monthly price efficiency is 
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defined as 1-Rres2/R2. Where R2 is R-squared calculated by 
regressing daily stock return on the same day and four days 
lagged value-weighted market return.  Rres2 is R-squared 
calculated by regressing daily stock return on value-weighted 
market return only. 
Volatility_S Monthly volatility of the stock, defined as the annualized 
standard deviation of daily stock returns in the current month 
Illiquidity_S Monthly Amihud illiquidity measure of the stock, defined as 
monthly average of daily stock Amihud ratio. Daily Amihud 
ratio is defined as 106 * daily absolute stock return (in %) 
divided by trading volume (in Chinese Yuan) 
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Table 1. Additions and Deletions of the Designated List  
This table reports the addition and deletion events on the designated list of stocks that are allowed for 
margin trading and short selling. Announcement date is the date when the addition or deletion of the 
designated list is announced. Effective date is the date when the addition or deletion of the designated list 
takes place. Addition/deletion represents the number of stocks that are added to/deleted from the list. 
Total represents the number of stocks on the list after the effective. Exchange traded funds (ETFs) are not 
included in the table.         
 
Announcement Date  Effective Date Addition Deletion Total 
2/12/2010 3/31/2010 90 0 90 
11/25/2011 12/5/2011 189 1 278 
1/25/2013 1/31/2013 276 53 501 
9/6/2013 9/16/2013 206 1 700 
9/12/2014 9/22/2014 218 13 900 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of the monthly data on corporate bonds issued by listed firms 
with valid bond spreads between January 2009 and December 2015. All accounting variables are 
measured at the most recent fiscal year end. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
Definitions of variables are reported in Appendix A.           
        
 
Mean StdDev Min P25 P50 P75 Max N 
Spread 2.460 1.190 0.440 1.644 2.244 2.992 7.031 16,639 
Maturity 3.717 1.901 0.140 2.380 3.670 4.740 9.340 16,639 
Volatility_B 0.005 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.048 16,639 
Illiquidity_B 0.009 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.225 16,639 
List 0.482 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 16,639 
(ln)Size 9.194 1.163 6.967 8.383 9.030 9.869 13.100 16,151 
BM 0.701 0.396 0.120 0.416 0.627 0.907 2.113 16,570 
ROA 3.481 3.507 -7.209 1.304 2.894 5.400 13.715 16,605 
Lev 0.574 0.150 0.197 0.475 0.584 0.686 0.846 16,605 
SOE 0.586 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 16,598 
Intangibiity 0.051 0.078 0.000 0.012 0.031 0.061 0.538 16,605 
NoDualList 0.838 0.368 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 16,639 
NoBig4Audit 0.815 0.388 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 16,639 
ForecastErr 0.532 1.212 0.001 0.098 0.250 0.524 10.281 14,857 
ForecastDisp 0.284 0.345 0.000 0.093 0.185 0.342 2.199 14,213 
IndepDir 0.372 0.055 0.308 0.333 0.333 0.400 0.571 16,582 
MgtHold 0.050 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.608 15,981 
Divergent 5.982 8.420 0.000 0.000 0.000 12.012 32.340 15,499 
Dual 0.137 0.344 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 16,432 
PIN 0.110 0.042 0.001 0.082 0.107 0.134 0.235 16,228 
PI  2.967 1.469 0.213 1.940 2.744 3.765 7.822 16,116 
PriceEff 0.289 0.257 0.007 0.092 0.198 0.416 0.992 16,065 
Volatility_S 0.424 0.228 0.125 0.265 0.361 0.516 1.194 16,120 
Illiquidity_S 0.034 0.046 0.001 0.008 0.018 0.041 0.280 16,151 
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Table 3. Trading Restrictions and Corporate Bond Spreads  
This table presents the regression of corporate bond spreads on Listi,t, which is one if the issuer of 
bond i is on the designated list in month t and zero otherwise. The full sample includes all bonds 
with valid spreads during the sample period from January 2009 and December 2015. The List-only 
sample only includes bonds issued by stocks that have been on the designated list at least once during the 
sample period. The matched sample includes the list-only sample and its matching sample. For any given 
month, a bond in the list-only sample is matched to a similar bond issued by stocks that is not on the list. 
The matching is based on the Mahalanobis distance calculated from bond maturity, stock market 
capitalization, turnover, and volatility. T-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered 
at the bond level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
         
Dep.Var=Spread 
Full sample List-only sample Matched sample  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
List -0.240*** -0.249*** -0.152** -0.171*** -0.166*** -0.175*** 
 (-4.00) (-4.34) (-2.33) (-2.66) (-2.73) (-3.03) 
(ln)Size  -0.076*  -0.039  -0.078* 
  (-1.65)  (-0.85)  (-1.74) 
BM  -0.025  0.040  0.044 
  (-0.29)  (0.49)  (0.58) 
ROA  -0.057***  -0.039***  -0.056*** 
  (-7.34)  (-4.12)  (-5.53) 
Lev  0.659*  0.547  1.141*** 
  (1.75)  (1.52)  (3.11) 
SOE  0.514**  0.589  0.337* 
  (2.40)  (1.51)  (1.79) 
Maturity  -0.158  0.037  0.006 
  (-1.12)  (0.84)  (0.14) 
Volatility_B  0.312  -2.775***  -0.256 
  (0.27)  (-2.68)  (-0.18) 
Illiquidity_B  -0.875***  -0.298  -0.630* 
  (-3.41)  (-1.05)  (-1.75) 
Bond FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.734 0.748 0.726 0.733 0.733 0.751 
Observations 16,639 16,112 11,259 10,987 21,766 21,735 
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Table 4. Timing of the Effect 
This table reports the regression of corporate bond spreads on three dummy variables: 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(-6), 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(6) and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(6+), where 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(-6) is one if month t is within six months before stock i is added 
to the designated list and zero otherwise; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(6) is one if month t is within six months after stock i is 
added to the designated list and zero otherwise; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(7+) is one if month t is seven or more months 
after stock i is added to the designated list and zero otherwise. T-statistics, in parentheses, are based on 
standard errors clustered at the bond level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Dep.Var=Spread (1) (2) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(-6) -0.043 -0.030 
 (-0.70) (-0.51) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(6) -0.142** -0.142** 
 (-2.15) (-2.27) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡(7+) -0.333*** -0.334*** 
 (-3.68) (-3.86) 
(ln)Size  -0.082* 
  (-1.77) 
BM  -0.028 
  (-0.33) 
ROA  -0.057*** 
  (-7.25) 
Lev  0.668* 
  (1.77) 
SOE  0.532** 
  (2.51) 
Maturity  -0.164 
  (-1.19) 
Volatility_B  0.219 
  (0.19) 
Illiquidity_B  -0.878*** 
  (-3.40) 
Bond Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.735 0.749 
Observations 16,639 16,112 
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Table 5. Placebo Tests 
This table reports the regression of corporate bond spreads on various dummy variables. Listi,t is 
one if the issuer of bond i is on the designated list in month t and zero otherwise. 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑂𝑉𝑆𝑖𝑡is 
one if stock i is included in the designated list before the most recent addition and zero otherwise. 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑁𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 is one if stock i is included in the designated list at the most recent addition and zero 
otherwise. For each of the five major additions to the designated list, we create a fictitious list of 
stocks that are ranked the highest according to (1) among the stocks that were not added to the 
list at the addition. We construct measure (1) based on the data during the three months before 
each addition event, and choose the number of the stocks on this fictitious list to be the same as 
the number of stocks that were actually added to the designated list at the most recent revision. 
This fictitious list stays the same until the next major revision. 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑉it is one if stock i 
is on this fictitious list in month t, and zero otherwise. Control variables are the same as those in 
Table 3. T-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the bond level are reported 
in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Full sample: 200901-201512 
Dep.Var=Spread (1) (2) (3) (4) 
List -0.275*** -0.285*** 
  
 
(-3.83) (-4.10) 
  List_Old 
  
-0.420*** -0.425*** 
   
(-4.50) (-4.74) 
List_New 
  
-0.215*** -0.220*** 
   
(-3.40) (-3.64) 
List_Placebo -0.064 -0.066 -0.059 -0.058 
 
(-1.07) (-1.17) (-1.01) (-1.05) 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Bond Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.734 0.748 0.736 0.750 
Observations 16,640 16,112 16,640 16,112 
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Panel B. Subsample: 201302-201512 
Dep.Var=Spread (1) (2) (3) (4) 
List -0.327*** -0.339*** 
  
 
(-3.14) (-3.43) 
  List_Old 
  
-0.378*** -0.387*** 
   
(-3.14) (-3.36) 
List_New 
  
-0.278*** -0.283*** 
   
(-2.70) (-2.95) 
List_Placebo -0.114 -0.152 -0.091 -0.127 
 
(-1.22) (-1.63) (-0.95) (-1.32) 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Bond Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.765 0.771 0.765 0.771 
Observations 12,131 11,673 12,131 11,673 
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Table 6. Fuzzy RDD: Trading Restrictions and Corporate Bond Spreads 
The first stage regression is based on the pooled data from addition 3, 4, and 5. For 
revision k (k=3, 4, 5), and for each stock that is not on the designated list, we compute 
𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖
𝑘 according to measure (1) based on the data during the three months before the 
revision date. The dummy variable 𝜏𝑖𝑘 is one if 𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑘 ≤ 𝑃𝑘, and zero otherwise, 
where 𝑃𝑘 is the number of stocks that were added to the list at revision k. 𝐷𝑖𝑘 is a 
dummy variable that is one if stock i is added to the designated list at revision k, and zero 
otherwise. Panel A reports the first-stage regression results for various bandwidths: 
𝐷𝑖
𝑘 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝜏𝑖𝑘 + 𝛼2�𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑘 − 𝑃𝑘� + 𝛼3𝜏𝑖𝑘 × �𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑘 − 𝑃𝑘� + 𝜀𝑖𝑘. 
Panel B presents the second-stage regression: 
𝑆𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷�𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽2�𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑘 − 𝑃𝑘� + 𝛽3𝜏𝑖𝑘 × �𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑘 − 𝑃𝑘� + 𝜈𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝐷�𝑖𝑘 is the fitted value from the first stage regression. T-statistics, in parentheses, are 
based on standard errors clustered at both the bond and month levels. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: First Stage 
 Bandwidth 
 
100 90 80 70 60 50 
τ 0.603  0.588  0.571  0.548  0.520  0.495  
 
(9.18) (8.87) (8.52) (8.25) (7.89) (6.96) 
rank-c -0.003  -0.003  -0.004  -0.004  -0.006  -0.007  
 
(-2.22) (-2.15) (-2.09) (-2.04) (-2.06) (-2.06) 
τ×(rank-c) 0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.003  
 
(0.01) (0.11) (0.21) (0.25) (0.35) (0.55) 
Constant 0.170  0.180  0.192  0.206  0.226  0.251  
 
(2.39) (2.39) (2.38) (2.37) (2.37) (2.36) 
Adjusted R2 0.624  0.603  0.580  0.556  0.529  0.491  
Observations 1,200  1,080  960  840  720  600  
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Panel B: Second Stage 
 Bandwidth 
 
100 90 80 70 60 50 
𝐷� -0.303  -0.307  -0.309  -0.271  -0.204  -0.250  
 
(-3.42) (-3.29) (-3.09) (-2.73) (-2.17) (-2.16) 
rank-c 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.000  
 
(0.69) (0.59) (0.36) (0.58) (0.66) (0.03) 
τ×(rank-c) -0.005  -0.006  -0.005  -0.006  -0.005  -0.003  
 
(-6.07) (-4.79) (-3.52) (-2.83) (-1.74) (-0.68) 
Adjusted R2 0.461  0.465  0.466  0.468  0.469  0.466  
Observations 2,236  1,968  1,779  1,559  1,368  1,111  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
42 
 
Table 7. Trading Restrictions and Stock Market 
This table reports the results from regressions of various stock market variables on Listi,t, which 
is one if stock i is on the designated list in month t and zero otherwise. Inefficiency is the 
price inefficiency measure from Hou and Moskowitz (2005). PIN is the probability of 
informed trading measure in Easley et al. (1996) and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara 
(2010). PI is the price impact measure in Huang and Stoll (1996). 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
average bid-ask spread of stock i in month t, 𝐴𝑉𝐿ℎ𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
ratio stock i in month t, and 𝑇𝑉𝑆𝑟𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the logarithm of the average turnover of 
stock i in month t. T-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the bond 
level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively.   
 
Panel A 
 PriceEff PI PIN BASpread Amihud Turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
List -0.037*** -0.168** -0.005** -0.014*** -0.005** 0.179*** 
 (-4.38) (-2.20) (-2.06) (-3.43) (-2.24) (4.78) 
(ln)Size 0.058*** -0.341*** 0.001 -0.027*** -0.009*** -0.422*** 
 (6.27) (-4.74) (0.27) (-6.28) (-3.31) (-9.61) 
BM -0.010 1.112*** 0.007 0.070*** 0.015*** -0.205*** 
 (-0.57) (7.72) (1.47) (9.09) (3.00) (-3.34) 
ROA -0.005*** 0.000 0.000 -0.002*** -0.001 0.007 
 (-3.66) (0.02) (0.03) (-4.74) (-1.48) (1.48) 
Lev 0.055 0.465 0.041*** 0.018 0.037** -0.821*** 
 (0.93) (1.04) (3.26) (0.81) (2.45) (-4.51) 
SOE -0.008 0.150 -0.005 0.007 0.004 0.024 
 (-0.36) (0.65) (-0.69) (0.70) (0.90) (0.43) 
Volatility_S 0.469*** 0.539*** -0.033*** -0.052*** -0.018 2.670*** 
 (19.78) (4.13) (-5.01) (-9.87) (-1.32) (38.78) 
Illiquidity_S(t-1) 0.016 -0.097 0.039 0.055*** 0.092*** -0.665*** 
 (0.44) (-0.41) (1.54) (5.67) (3.90) (-5.12) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.502 0.328 0.848 0.245 0.822 
Observations 13,159 13,186 4,859 13,188 13,209 13,209 
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Panel B 
 PriceEff PI PIN BASpread Amihud Turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
List(-6,0) -0.001 0.010 -0.004 -0.000 -0.010*** 0.209*** 
 (-0.06) (0.13) (-1.32) (-0.08) (-4.03) (4.40) 
List[0,6] -0.029*** -0.120* -0.009*** -0.013** -0.010*** 0.281*** 
 (-2.66) (-1.66) (-2.98) (-2.32) (-4.44) (5.84) 
List[7,+) -0.037*** -0.152* -0.006** -0.015*** -0.006** 0.240*** 
 (-3.26) (-1.74) (-2.03) (-2.78) (-2.29) (4.94) 
(ln)Size 0.058*** -0.316*** 0.001 -0.027*** -0.009*** -0.433*** 
 (6.27) (-5.15) (0.39) (-6.27) (-3.11) (-9.81) 
BM -0.010 0.998*** 0.007 0.069*** 0.014*** -0.189*** 
 (-0.58) (8.10) (1.42) (9.19) (2.86) (-3.09) 
ROA -0.005*** 0.004 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001 0.007 
 (-3.64) (0.46) (-0.02) (-4.71) (-1.52) (1.50) 
Lev 0.055 0.442 0.040*** 0.018 0.036** -0.808*** 
 (0.94) (1.27) (3.22) (0.81) (2.38) (-4.32) 
SOE -0.009 0.015 -0.004 0.007 0.004 0.008 
 (-0.39) (0.09) (-0.62) (0.68) (1.08) (0.13) 
Volatility_S 0.469*** 0.449*** -0.032*** -0.052*** -0.017 2.657*** 
 (19.74) (4.39) (-4.89) (-9.88) (-1.26) (38.89) 
Illiquidity_S(t-1) 0.016 -0.187 0.036 0.055*** 0.091*** -0.645*** 
 (0.45) (-1.00) (1.43) (5.66) (3.86) (-5.02) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.328 0.533 0.329 0.854 0.274 0.830 
Observations 13,159 13,186 4,859 13,188 13,209 13,209 
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Table 8. Opaqueness and the Effect of Trading Restrictions 
This table presents the regression of corporate bond spreads on List and its interaction with 
measures of the opaqueness of the firm, including Intangibility_High, NoDualList, NoBig4Audit, 
ForecastErr_High, and ForecastDisp_High. List is one if the stock that issues the bond is on the 
designated list and zero otherwise. Intangibility_High is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
intangibility of the stock is above the median of the sample and zero otherwise. NoDualList is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a stock does not have dual listed shares (B or H shares) and 
zero otherwise. NoBig4Audit is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is not audited by a 
big 4 auditor and zero otherwise. ForecastErr_High is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
firm’s analyst forecast error is higher than the median of the full sample and zero otherwise. 
ForecastDisp_High is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s analyst forecast dispersion 
is higher than the median of the full sample and zero otherwise. T-statistics, in parentheses, are 
based on standard errors clustered at the bond level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep.Var=Spread Intangibility DualList Audit Error Dispersion 
List -0.179*** 0.018 -0.058 -0.143*** -0.137*** 
 (-3.01) (0.18) (-0.63) (-2.87) (-2.67) 
List×Opaque -0.135** -0.294*** -0.238** -0.140** -0.142*** 
 (-2.00) (-2.86) (-2.37) (-2.44) (-2.63) 
Opaque 0.115* 0.296* 0.380** 0.016 0.074* 
 (1.84) (1.70) (2.09) (0.35) (1.79) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bond Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.749 0.749 0.749 0.741 0.740 
Observations 16,112 16,112 16,112 14,488 13,849 
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Table 9. Credit Ratings and the Effect of Trading Restrictions 
This table reports the regression of corporate bond spreads on List and its interaction with bond 
credit ratings. List is one if the stock that issues the bond is on the designated list and zero 
otherwise. AAA is one if a bond is rated as AAA and zero otherwise. AA+ is one if a bond is rated 
as AA+ and zero otherwise. AAorBelow is one if a bond is rated as AA or below and zero 
otherwise. All other control variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics, in parentheses, are 
based on standard errors clustered at the bond level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Dep.Var=Spread (1) (2) 
List*AAA -0.128** -0.065 
 
(-1.96) (-1.02) 
List*AA+ -0.234*** -0.257*** 
 
(-3.21) (-3.63) 
List*AAorBelow -0.295*** -0.336*** 
 
(-3.60) (-4.36) 
AAA -1.123*** -0.993*** 
 
(-2.84) (-2.68) 
AA+ -0.338 -0.253 
 
(-1.07) (-0.91) 
(ln)Size 
 
-0.074 
  
(-1.64) 
BM 
 
-0.023 
  
(-0.27) 
ROA 
 
-0.059*** 
  
(-7.76) 
Lev 
 
0.672* 
  
(1.79) 
SOE 
 
0.501** 
  
(2.42) 
Maturity 
 
-0.159 
  
(-1.11) 
Volatility_B 
 
0.426 
  
(0.38) 
Illiquidity_B 
 
-0.824*** 
  
(-3.28) 
Bond Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.735 0.749 
Observations 16,639 16,112 
46 
 
Table 10. Corporate Governance and the Effect of Trading Restrictions 
This table present s the regression of corporate governance measures on List, which is one if the 
stock is on the designated list and zero otherwise. We adopt four commonly used corporate 
governance measures, including the ratio of independent directors (IndepDir), CEO duality 
(Dual), divergence ratio (Divergence), and managerial ownership (MgtHold). All other control 
variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors 
clustered at the bond level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
IndepDir Dual Divergent MgtHold 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
List -0.000 0.000 0.634 0.015 
 
(-0.11) (0.11) (1.27) (0.69) 
(ln)Size 0.000 -0.002 -0.543 -0.000 
 
(0.15) (-1.28) (-1.31) (-0.01) 
BM 0.006 0.005* -0.815 0.003 
 
(0.92) (1.80) (-0.83) (0.07) 
ROA 0.000 0.001 0.129 0.001 
 
(0.18) (1.14) (1.06) (0.18) 
Lev -0.017 -0.024 1.759 0.222 
 
(-0.62) (-0.79) (0.49) (1.34) 
SOE -0.022 -0.016 0.990 -0.119 
 
(-1.02) (-1.04) (0.24) (-0.93) 
Illiquidity_S 0.010 -0.001 1.149 -0.084 
 
(0.39) (-0.03) (0.36) (-0.41) 
Vol_S -0.009 -0.001 2.091 0.080 
 
(-0.82) (-0.21) (0.93) (0.77) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.810 0.984 0.885 0.743 
Observations 1,438 1,384 1,332 1,426 
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Figure 1. Bond Spreads Around Additions of Margin Trading List 
This figure plots the average bond spreads of treated (dashed line) and control firms (dotted line) 
for each month (from -3 to +12 month) around the event month that stocks are added to the 
designated list. The solid line represents the difference in the average bond spreads between 
treated and control firms. Treated firms refer to firms that are included in the margin trading list 
and controls firms refer to firms that are not included in the list. 
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Figure 2. The probability of addition to the margin trading list and stock ranks 
The probability of addition to the designated list is plotted against stock ranks for 
addition 3 (Panel A), 4 (Panel B), and 5(Panel C). Bin width equals 10. The y-axis 
represents the average probability over the number of ranks equal to the bin width. The 
x-axis equals (rank – cutoff)/bin width. 
 
 
 
 
